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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-li-idr-savnet-intra-domain-bgp-02" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title>Source Address Validation at Intra-domain Network Boundary Using BGP</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-li-idr-savnet-intra-domain-bgp-02"/>
    <author initials="D." surname="Li" fullname="Dan Li">
      <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>tolidan@tsinghua.edu.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Yue" fullname="Shengnan Yue">
      <organization>China Mobile</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>yueshengnan@chinamobile.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="Z." surname="Li" fullname="Zhenbin Li">
      <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>lizhenbin@huawei.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="L." surname="Qin" fullname="Lancheng Qin">
      <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>qinlc@mail.zgclab.edu.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="October" day="12"/>
    <area>Routing</area>
    <workgroup>IDR</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 58?>

<t>This document proposes a solution for Source Address Validation (SAV) at the intra-domain network boundary using BGP. Routers at the boundary automatically generate accurate SAV rules by using routing information and SAV-specific information. These rules construct a validation boundary which checks the validity of the source address of any data packets flowing into the intra-domain network. This document also introduces BGP extensions for communicating SAV-specific information among routers at the boundary.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 62?>

<section anchor="sec-intro">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Source address validation (SAV) is essential for mitigating source address spoofing attacks (<xref target="RFC6959"/>) on the Internet. The current operational intra-domain SAV mechanisms include Access List Control (ACL) <xref target="RFC2827"/> and unicast Reverse Path Forwarding <xref target="RFC3704"/>. Their technical problems are detailed in <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement"/> and a new intra-domain SAV solution that can generate accurate SAV rules in an automatic way is needed.</t>
      <t>This document proposes a solution for SAV at the intra-domain network boundary using BGP. We refer to both edge routers and border routers as routers at the boundary of an intra-domain network. Routers at the boundary automatically generate accurate SAV rules by using routing information and SAV-specific information. These rules construct a validation boundary which checks the validity of the source address of any data packets flowing into the intra-domain network. This document also introduces BGP extensions for communicating SAV-specific information among routers at the boundary.</t>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>SAV Rule: The rule that describes the mapping relationship between a source address (prefix) and its valid incoming router interface(s).</t>
        <t>SAV-specific Information: The information specialized for SAV rule generation, which is exchanged among routers.</t>
        <t>Non-BGP Customer Network: A stub network connected to one or more routers of the AS for Internet connectivity. It only originates traffic and does not participate in BGP routing exchanges with the AS.</t>
        <t>Edge Router: A router connected to hosts or non-BGP customer networks of the local AS. It forwards traffic from hosts or non-BGP customer networks into the intra-domain network.</t>
        <t>Border Router: A router positioned at the boundary between the local AS and one or more external Autonomous Systems (ASes). It runs EBGP and exchanges routing information with external peers.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

</section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sav-procedure-at-edge-routers">
      <name>SAV Procedure at Edge Routers</name>
      <t>Edge routers will generate a prefix allowlist on interfaces facing a non-BGP customer network or a set of host, including only prefixes that can be used as the source address by the non-BGP customer network or the set of hosts. For example, in <xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/>, the prefix allowlist on Intf. 1 should only include all the source prefixes of non-BGP customer network1, the prefix allowlist on Intf. 2 and Intf. 3 should only include all the source prefixes of non-BGP customer network2, and the prefix allowlist on Intf.4 should only include the network segment of the hosts.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-intra-savnet">
        <name>An example of SAV at the boundary of an intra-domain network</name>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
+-----------------------------------------+
|               Other ASes                |
+-----------------------------------------+
              |      |                 
              |      |                 
+-------------|------|--------------------+
| AS          |      |                    |
|       Intf.5|      |Intf.6              |
|           +-*------*-+                  |
|           | Router 3 |                  |
|           +----------+                  |
|              /     \                    |
|             /       \                   |
|            /         \                  |
|   +----------+     +----------+         |
|   | Router 1 |     | Router 2 |         |
|   +--#-----#-+     +-#-----#--+         |
|Intf.1|Intf.2\ Intf.3/       \Intf.4     |
|      |       \     /         \          |
|      |        \   /           \         |
|   Non-BGP    Non-BGP           Hosts    |
|   Customer1  Customer2                  |
+-----------------------------------------+

Intf '#' enables prefix allowlist
Intf '*' enables prefix blocklist

]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>To construct a prefix allowlist on the specific interface, the edge router inspects its local Routing Information Base (RIB) and identifies destination prefixes that are reachable via that interface. These prefixes should cover the complete source address space of the connected hosts, single-homed non-BGP customer networks, or multi-homed non-BGP customer networks with symmetric routing.</t>
      <t>In asymmetric routing scenarios, these prefixes derived from the local RIB may fail to cover the complete source address space of multi-homed non-BGP customer networks. For example, in <xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/>, the prefix that is reachable via Intf.2 may be part of the complete source address space of non-BGP customer network2 because the other part is only reachable via Intf.3. One approach is to configure static routes with lower priority on the Intf.2 and Intf.3 of Router1 to achieve symmetric routing, without influencing the Forwarding Information Base‌ (FIB) . However, static configuration requires additional manual overhead.</t>
      <t>To address this limitation, the Source Prefix Advertisement (SPA) process <xref target="I-D.li-savnet-source-prefix-advertisement"/> is required to enable the construction of a more accurate and complete allowlist. During the SPA process, edge routers will announce these prefixes together with other SAV-specific information. The SAV-specific information includes:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Multi-homing Interface Group Type (MIIG-Type): It indicates the type of the interface that learns the prefix. In general, there are two types of interfaces: single-homing interface (e.g., Intf.1 and Intf.4 in <xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/>) and multi-homing interface (e.g., Intf.2 and Intf.3 in <xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Multi-homing Interface Group Tag (MIIG-Tag): It is to identify the non-BGP customer network of the prefix. Prefixes belonging to the same non-BGP customer network <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have the identical MIIG-Tag value. Different non-BGP customer networks <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have different MIIG-tag values.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>(Only) Source Flag: It indicates whether the prefix is an internal-use-only prefix. By default, the flag is set because most prefixes are internal-use-only. For prefixes which are also used to source traffic by other ASes, the flag should be unset.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The detailed procedure for the prefix allowlist generation is as follows:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>For each interface connecting a non-BGP customer network or a set of hosts, create a set of unique prefixes that are reachable via that interface by inspecting the local RIB. Call it Set A.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Considering prefixes and SAV-specific information provided by other edge routers, create a set of unique prefixes that have the same MIIG-Type and MIIG-Tag as prefixes in Set A. Call it Set B.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Form the union of Set A and Set B. Apply the union set at the interface as a prefix allowlist.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sav-procedure-at-border-routers">
      <name>SAV Procedure at Border routers</name>
      <t>Border routers aim to generate a prefix blocklist on interfaces facing an external AS, including prefixes that can be only used as the source address by the local AS (i.e., internal source addresses). For example, in <xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/>, the prefix blocklist on Intf. 5 and Intf. 6 should include the prefixes of non-BGP customer network1, non-BGP customer network2, and hosts.</t>
      <t>The detailed procedure for the prefix blocklist generation is as follows:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Considering prefixes and SAV-specific information provided by edge routers, creat a set of unique prefixes with Source Flag being set. Call it Set C.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Apply Set C at the interface facing an external AS as a prefix blocklist.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
    <section anchor="bgp-extensions-for-intra-domain-savnet">
      <name>BGP Extensions for Intra-domain SAVNET</name>
      <section anchor="sec-relat">
        <name>BGP Protocol Relationship</name>
        <t>The BGP extensions for SPA communication follow a backward compatible manner without impacting existing BGP functions. New BGP SAVNET subsequent address families will be introduced under the IPv4 address family and the IPv6 address family, respectively. The BGP UPDATE message (specifically the MP_REACH_NLRI and the MP_UNREACH_NLRI attributes) and the BGP Refresh message will be extended. AFI and SAFI will be used for distinguishing the BGP SAVNET messages from other messages.</t>
        <t>A few existing path attributes such as Originator_ID and Clister_list or newly defined path attributes <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used for BGP SAVNET. Actually, most existing path attributes are not necessarily required for BGP SAVNET. However, if the unnecessary path attributes are carried in BGP updates, they will be accepted, validated, and propagated consistent with the BGP protocol.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-peering">
        <name>Full-mesh IBGP Peering</name>
        <t>Edge or border routers enabling BGP SAVNET <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> establish full-mesh iBGP sessions either through direct iBGP sessions or route-reflectors. SAVNET messages within an AS can be advertised through the full-mesh BGP SAVNET sessions. The extensions of BGP messages for carrying SAVNET messages will be introduced in <xref target="sec-extension"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-extension">
        <name>BGP SAVNET Protocol Extension</name>
        <section anchor="bgp-savnet-safi">
          <name>BGP SAVNET SAFI</name>
          <t>To make good isolation with existing BGP services, this document defines BGP SAVNET SAFIs under the IPv4 address family and the IPv6 address family, respectively.  The values require IANA registration as specified in <xref target="sec-iana"/>. Two BGP SAVNET speakers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> establish a BGP SAVNET peer and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> exchange the Multiprotocol Extensions Capability <xref target="RFC5492"/> to ensure that they are both capable of processing BGP SAVNET messages properly.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="bgp-savnet-nlri">
          <name>BGP SAVNET NLRI</name>
          <t>The BGP SAVNET NLRI is used to transmit SPA messages (either IPv4 or IPv6). The BGP SAVNET NLRI TLVs are carried in BGP UPDATE messages as (1) route advertisement carried within Multiprotocol Reachable NLRI (MP_REACH_NLRI) <xref target="RFC4760"/>, and (2) route withdraw carried within Multiprotocol Unreachable NLRI (MP_UNREACH_NLRI).</t>
          <t>While encoding an MP_REACH_NLRI attribute containing BGP SAVNET NLRI TLVs, the "Length of Next Hop Network Address" field <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be set to 0 upon the sender. The "Network Address of Next Hop" field <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> not be encoded upon the sender, because it has a 0 length and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored upon the receiver.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="spa-tlvs">
          <name>SPA TLVs</name>
          <t>The BGP SAVNET NLRI TLV each carries an SPA message including a source prefix and related information. Therefore, the NLRI TLV is called SPA TLV. This type of TLVs are used in SPA process within an AS. The format is shown below:</t>
          <figure>
            <name>SPA TLV format</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
 0                   1                   2                   3  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| RouteType (1) |   Length (1)  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                        Origin router-id (4)                   |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  MaskLen (1)  |        IP Prefix (variable)                   |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MIIG-Type (1) | Flags (1)   |S|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                         MIIG-Tag (4)                          |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t>The meaning of these fields are as follows:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>RouteType (key): Type of the BGP SAVNET NLRI TLV, the value is 1 for SPA TLV within an AS.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Length: The length of the BGP SAVNET NLRI value, the RouteType and Length fields are excluded.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Origin router-id (key): The router ID of the originating node of the source prefix in the deployment domain.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>MaskLen (key): The mask length in bits, which also indicates the valid bits of the IP Prefix field.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>IP Prefix (key): IP address. The length ranges from 1 to 4 bytes for IPv4 and ranges from 1 to 16 bytes for IPv6. Format is consistent with BGP IPv4/IPv6 unicast address.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>MIIG-Type (non-key): Multi-homing Ingress Interface Group Type.
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>Type value 0: Unknown. Indicates that this prefix does not come from any non-BGP customer networks or hosts. It can be a local prefix or a local domain prefix.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>Type value 1: Single-homing interface. Indicates that this prefix comes from a non-BGP customer network or a set of hosts that is single-homed to the local domain.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>Type value 2: Multi-homing interface. Indicates that this prefix comes from a non-BGP customer network or a set of hosts that is multi-homed to the local domain, and is connected only to the local domain.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>Type value 3~255: Reserved for future use.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Flags (non-key): Bitmap, indicating the attribute flag of the SPA prefix, currently taken:
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>bit 0 (S bit) : Source Flag. The value of 1 indicates that the SPA prefix is single-homing. The value of 0 indicates that the SPA prefix is multi-homing.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>MIIG-Tag (non-key): Multi-homing Ingress Interface Group Tag. The value ranges from 1 to 0xFFFFFFFE. The value 0 is invalid and the value 0xFFFFFFFF is reserved.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-dp">
      <name>Decision Process with BGP SAVNET</name>
      <t>The Decision Process described in <xref target="RFC4271"/> works to determines a degree of preference among routes with the same prefix. The Decision Process involves many BGP Path attributes, which are not necessary for BGP SAVNET SPA process, such as next-hop attributes and IGP-metric attributes. Therefore, this document introduces a simplified Decision Process for SAVNET SAFI.</t>
      <t>The purpose of SPA is to maintain a uniform Source Prefix list, which is the mapping from original router-id to IP addresses, across all routers in the deploy domain. To ensure this, it is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that all routers deploy no ingress or egress route-policies for BGP SAVNET.</t>
      <section anchor="bgp-savnet-nlri-selection">
        <name>BGP SAVNET NLRI Selection</name>
        <t>The Decision Process described in <xref target="RFC4271"/> no longer apply, and the Decision Process for BGP SAVNET NLRI are as follows:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>The locally imported route is preferred over the route received from a peer.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The route received from a peer with the numerically larger originator is preferred.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The route received from a peer with the numerically larger Peer IP Address is preferred.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <section anchor="self-originated-nlri">
          <name>Self-Originated NLRI</name>
          <t>BGP SAVNET NLRI with origin router-id matching the local router-id is considered self-originated. All locally imported routes should be considered self-originated by default.</t>
          <t>Since the origin router-id is part of the NLRI key, it is very unlikely that a self-originated NLRI would be received from a peer. Unless a router-id conflict occurs due to incorrect configuration. In this case, the self-originated NLRI <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be discarded upon the receiver, and appropriate error logging is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>.</t>
          <t>On the other hand, besides the route learn from peers, a BGP SAVNET speaker <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> advertise NLRI which is not self-originated.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="bgp-source-prefix-filtering">
        <name>BGP Source Prefix Filtering</name>
        <t>In actual network deployment, operaters may need to specify whether some source prefixes requires filtering, and BGP community attributes can be used to identify the source prefixes that require filtration.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-error">
      <name>Error Handling</name>
      <section anchor="process-of-bgp-savnet-nlris">
        <name>Process of BGP SAVNET NLRIs</name>
        <t>When a BGP SAVNET speaker receives a BGP Update containing a malformed MP_REACH_NLRI or MP_UNREACH_NLRI, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore the received TLV and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> pass it to other BGP peers. When discarding a malformed TLV, a BGP SAVNET speaker <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> log a specific error.</t>
        <t>If duplicate NLRIs exist in a MP_REACH_NLRI or MP_UNREACH_NLRI attribute, only the last one <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="process-of-bgp-savnet-spa-tlvs">
        <name>Process of BGP SAVNET SPA TLVs</name>
        <t>When a BGP SAVNET speaker receives an SPA TLV with an undefined type, it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be ignored or stored without parsing.</t>
        <t>When a BGP SAVNET speaker receives an SPA TLV with a 0 origin router-id, or the origin router-id is the same as the local router-id, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be considered malformed.</t>
        <t>When a BGP SAVNET speaker receives an SPA TLV with an invalid MaskLen field, which is out of the range 1~32 for IPv4 and 1~128 for IPv6, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be considered malformed.</t>
        <t>When a BGP SAVNET speaker receives an SPA TLV with an address field, whose length in bytes do not match with the remaining data, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be considered malformed.</t>
        <t>When a BGP SAVNET speaker receives an SPA TLV with an unsupported MIIG-Type, it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be ignored or stored without parsing.</t>
        <t>When a BGP SAVNET speaker receives an SPA TLV with a MIIG-Type 0 (Unknown), its MIIG-Tag <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also be 0, vice versa. Otherwise this SPA TLV <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be considered malformed.</t>
        <t>When a BGP SAVNET speaker receives a malformed SPA TLV, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore the received TLV and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> pass it to other BGP peers. When discarding a malformed TLV, a BGP SAVNET speaker <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> log a specific error.</t>
        <t>When a BGP SAVNET speaker processes Flags in an SPA TLV, the defined bits <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be processed and the undefined bits <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>TBD.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>The BGP SAVNET SAFIs under the IPv4 address family and the IPv6 address family need to be allocated by IANA.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgements">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>TBD.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC4760" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4760" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4760.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4</title>
            <author fullname="T. Bates" initials="T." surname="Bates"/>
            <author fullname="R. Chandra" initials="R." surname="Chandra"/>
            <author fullname="D. Katz" initials="D." surname="Katz"/>
            <author fullname="Y. Rekhter" initials="Y." surname="Rekhter"/>
            <date month="January" year="2007"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines extensions to BGP-4 to enable it to carry routing information for multiple Network Layer protocols (e.g., IPv6, IPX, L3VPN, etc.). The extensions are backward compatible - a router that supports the extensions can interoperate with a router that doesn't support the extensions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4760"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4760"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5492" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5492.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Capabilities Advertisement with BGP-4</title>
            <author fullname="J. Scudder" initials="J." surname="Scudder"/>
            <author fullname="R. Chandra" initials="R." surname="Chandra"/>
            <date month="February" year="2009"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines an Optional Parameter, called Capabilities, that is expected to facilitate the introduction of new capabilities in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) by providing graceful capability advertisement without requiring that BGP peering be terminated.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 3392. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5492"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5492"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC4271" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4271.xml">
          <front>
            <title>A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Rekhter" initials="Y." role="editor" surname="Rekhter"/>
            <author fullname="T. Li" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Li"/>
            <author fullname="S. Hares" initials="S." role="editor" surname="Hares"/>
            <date month="January" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document discusses the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is an inter-Autonomous System routing protocol.</t>
              <t>The primary function of a BGP speaking system is to exchange network reachability information with other BGP systems. This network reachability information includes information on the list of Autonomous Systems (ASes) that reachability information traverses. This information is sufficient for constructing a graph of AS connectivity for this reachability from which routing loops may be pruned, and, at the AS level, some policy decisions may be enforced.</t>
              <t>BGP-4 provides a set of mechanisms for supporting Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR). These mechanisms include support for advertising a set of destinations as an IP prefix, and eliminating the concept of network "class" within BGP. BGP-4 also introduces mechanisms that allow aggregation of routes, including aggregation of AS paths.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 1771. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4271"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4271"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6959" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6959" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6959.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Threat Scope</title>
            <author fullname="D. McPherson" initials="D." surname="McPherson"/>
            <author fullname="F. Baker" initials="F." surname="Baker"/>
            <author fullname="J. Halpern" initials="J." surname="Halpern"/>
            <date month="May" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) effort aims to complement ingress filtering with finer-grained, standardized IP source address validation. This document describes threats enabled by IP source address spoofing both in the global and finer-grained context, describes currently available solutions and challenges, and provides a starting point analysis for finer-grained (host granularity) anti-spoofing work.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6959"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6959"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3704" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3704" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3704.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks</title>
            <author fullname="F. Baker" initials="F." surname="Baker"/>
            <author fullname="P. Savola" initials="P." surname="Savola"/>
            <date month="March" year="2004"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>BCP 38, RFC 2827, is designed to limit the impact of distributed denial of service attacks, by denying traffic with spoofed addresses access to the network, and to help ensure that traffic is traceable to its correct source network. As a side effect of protecting the Internet against such attacks, the network implementing the solution also protects itself from this and other attacks, such as spoofed management access to networking equipment. There are cases when this may create problems, e.g., with multihoming. This document describes the current ingress filtering operational mechanisms, examines generic issues related to ingress filtering, and delves into the effects on multihoming in particular. This memo updates RFC 2827. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="84"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3704"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3704"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2827" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2827.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing</title>
            <author fullname="P. Ferguson" initials="P." surname="Ferguson"/>
            <author fullname="D. Senie" initials="D." surname="Senie"/>
            <date month="May" year="2000"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This paper discusses a simple, effective, and straightforward method for using ingress traffic filtering to prohibit DoS (Denial of Service) attacks which use forged IP addresses to be propagated from 'behind' an Internet Service Provider's (ISP) aggregation point. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="38"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2827"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2827"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement-26" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Problem Statement, Gap Analysis, and Requirements for Intra-domain Source Address Validation</title>
            <author fullname="Lancheng Qin" initials="L." surname="Qin">
              <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Dan Li" initials="D." surname="Li">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jianping Wu" initials="J." surname="Wu">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mingqing(Michael) Huang" initials="M." surname="Huang">
              <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nan Geng" initials="N." surname="Geng">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="1" month="June" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Source address validation (SAV) is an important means to mitigate IP source address spoofing [RFC2827]. This document analyzes the gaps in current operational mechanisms for intra-domain SAV. It also identifies the properties that new intra-domain SAV mechanisms are expected to provide.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement-26"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.li-savnet-source-prefix-advertisement" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-li-savnet-source-prefix-advertisement-07" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.li-savnet-source-prefix-advertisement.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Source Prefix Advertisement for Intra-domain SAVNET</title>
            <author fullname="Lancheng Qin" initials="L." surname="Qin">
              <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nan Geng" initials="N." surname="Geng">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Dan Li" initials="D." surname="Li">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="24" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for generating interface-based prefix allowlists for intra-domain source address validation (SAV) on external interfaces facing directly connected hosts or non-BGP customer networks. The mechanism derives source prefixes from routing information and combines them with source prefixes provisioned by the AS operator. Routers use the combined source prefixes to generate SAV allowlists.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-li-savnet-source-prefix-advertisement-07"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 292?>



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